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Abstract
COVID-19 is highly transmissible and containing outbreaks requires a rapid and effective response.
Because infection may be spread by people who are pre-symptomatic or asymptomatic, substantial
undetected transmission is likely to occur before clinical cases are diagnosed. Thus, when outbreaks
occur there is a need to anticipate which populations and locations are at heightened risk of exposure.
In this work, we evaluate the utility of aggregate human mobility data for estimating the geographic
distribution of transmission risk. We present a simple procedure for producing spatial transmission risk
assessments from near-real-time population mobility data. We validate our estimates against three well-
documented COVID-19 outbreak scenarios in Australia. Two of these were well-defined transmission
clusters and one was a community transmission scenario. Our results indicate that mobility data can
be a good predictor of geographic patterns of exposure risk from transmission centres, particularly
in scenarios involving workplaces or other environments associated with habitual travel patterns. For
community transmission scenarios, our results demonstrate that mobility data adds the most value to risk
predictions when case counts are low and spatially clustered. Our method could assist health systems in
the allocation of testing resources, and potentially guide the implementation of geographically-targeted
restrictions on movement and social interaction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Similar to other respiratory pathogens such as influenza, the transmission of SARS-CoV-2
occurs when infected and susceptible individuals are co-located and have physical contact, or
exchange bioaerosols or droplets [1, 2]. Behavioural modification in response to symptom on-
set (i.e., self-isolation) can act as a spontaneous negative feedback on transmission potential
by reducing the rate of such contacts, making epidemics much easier to control and monitor.
However, COVID-19 (the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus) has been associated with rela-
tively long periods of pre-symptomatic viral shedding (approximately 5 - 10 days), during which
time case ascertainment and behavioural modification are unlikely [3, 4]. In addition, many
cases are characterised by mild symptoms, despite long periods of viral shedding [5]. Transmis-
sion studies have demonstrated that asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission hamper
control of SARS-CoV-2 [6–8]. Pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission has also been
documented systematically in several residential care facilities in which surveillance was essen-
tially complete [9, 10]. Currently, there are no prophylactic pharmaceutical interventions that are
effective against SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Therefore, interventions based on social distancing
and infection control practices have constituted the operative framework, applied in innumerable
variations around the world, to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.
Social distancing policies directly target human mobility. Therefore, it is logical to suggest
that data describing aggregate travel patterns would be useful in quantifying the complex effects
of policy announcements and decisions [11]. The ubiquity of mobile phones and public availability
of aggregated near-real-time movement patterns has led to several such studies in the context
of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic [12–14]. One source of mobility data is the social media
platform Facebook, which offers users a mobile app that includes location services at the user’s
discretion. These services document the GPS locations of users, which are aggregated as origin-
destination matrices and released for research purposes through the Facebook Data For Good
program. The raw data is stored on a temporary basis and aggregated in such a way as to protect
the privacy of individual users [15]. Several studies have utilised subsets of this data for analysis
of the effects of COVID-19 social distancing restrictions [16–19]
In this work, we complement these studies by addressing the question: to what degree can real-
time mobility patterns estimated from aggregate mobile phone data inform short-term predictions
of COVID-19 transmission risk?
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To do so, we develop a straight-forward procedure to generate a relative estimate of the
spatial distribution of future transmission risk based on current case data or locations of known
transmission centres. To critically evaluate the performance of our procedure, we retrospectively
generate risk estimates based on data from three outbreaks that occurred in Australia when there
was little background transmission.
The initial wave of infections in Australia began in early March, 2020, and peaked on March
28th with 469 new cases. The epidemic was suppressed through widespread social distancing
measures which escalated from bans on gatherings of more than 500 people (imposed on March
16th) to a nation-wide “lockdown” which began on March 29th and imposed a ban on gatherings
of more than 3 people. By late April, daily incidence numbers had dropped to fewer than 10 per
day [20]. The outbreaks we examine occurred during the subsequent period over which these
general suppression measures were progressively relaxed. One of these occurred in a workplace
over several weeks, one began during a gathering at a social venue, and one was a community
transmission scenario with no single identified outbreak center, which marked the beginning
of Australia’s “second wave” (which is ongoing as of August, 2020). The term “community
transmission” refers to situations in which multiple transmission chains have been detected with
no known links identified from contact tracing and no specific transmission centres are clearly
identifiable.
In each case, we use the Facebook mobility data that was available during the early stages of
the outbreak to estimate future spatial patterns of relative transmission risk. We then examine
the degree to which these estimates correlate with the subsequently observed case data in those
regions. Our results indicate that the accuracy of our estimates varies with outbreak context, with
higher correlation for the outbreak centred on a workplace, and lower correlation for the outbreak
centred on a social gathering. In the community transmission scenario without a well-defined
transmission locus, we compare the risk prediction based on mobility data to a null prediction
based only on active case numbers. Our results indicate that mobility is more informative during
the initial phases of the outbreak, when detected cases are spatially localised and many areas
have no available case data.
4
II. METHODS
Our general method is to use an Origin-Destination (OD) matrix based on Facebook mobility
data to estimate the diffusion of transmission risk based on one or more identified outbreak
sources. The data provided by Facebook comprises the number of individuals moving between
locations occupied in subsequent 8-hr intervals. For an individual user, the location occupied
is defined as the most frequently-visited location during the 8-hr interval. More details on the
raw data, the aggregation and pre-processing performed by Facebook before release, and our
pre-processing steps can be found in the Supplemental Information.
COVID-19 case data is made publicly available by most Australian state health authorities
on the scale of Local Government Areas (LGAs). In these urban and suburban regions, LGA
population densities typically vary from approximately 0.2 × 103 to 5 × 103 residents per km2,
but can be low as 20 residents per km2 in the suburban fringe where LGAs contain substantial
parkland and agricultural zones. The output of our method is a relative risk estimate for each
LGA based on their potential for local transmission. The general method is as follows:
1. Construct the prevalence vector p, a column vector with one element for each location
with a value corresponding to the transmission centre status of that location. For point-
outbreaks in areas with no background transmission, we use a vector with a value of 1 for
the location containing the transmission centre and 0 for all other locations. For outbreaks
with transmission in multiple locations, we construct p using the number of active cases
as reported by the relevant public health agency.
2. Construct an OD matrix M, where the value of a component Mij gives the number of
travellers starting their journey at location i (row index) and ending their journey at location
j (column index). To approximately match the pre-symptomatic period of COVID-19, we
average the OD matrix over the mobility data provided by Facebook during the week
preceding the identification of the targeted transmission centre. By averaging over an
appropriate time interval, the OD matrix is built to represent mobility during the initial
stages of the outbreak, when undocumented transmission may have been occurring. The
choice of appropriate time interval varied by scenario, as described below.
3. Multiply the OD matrix by the prevalence vector to produce an unscaled risk vector r with a
value for each location corresponding to the aggregate strength of its outgoing connections
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to transmission centres, weighted by the prevalence in each transmission centre. This is
re-scaled to give the relative transmission risk for each region Ri. In other words, we treat
the OD matrix as analogous to the stochastic transition matrix in a discrete-time Markov
chain, and compute the unscaled vector of risk values r as:
r = Mp , (1)
so that r is approximately proportional to the average interaction rate between susceptible
individuals from location i and infected individuals located in the outbreak centres. These
approximate interaction rates are then re-scaled to give relative risk values Ri between 0
and 1:
Ri =
ri∑
j rj
. (2)
For point-outbreaks, this is simply:
Ri =
Mik∑
j Mjk
, (3)
where k is the column index of the single outbreak location. The numerator is the number
of individuals travelling from region i to the outbreak centre, and the denominator is the
total number of travellers into the outbreak centre over all origin locations j.
In addition to the typical assumptions about equilibrium mixing (in the absence of more
detailed interaction data), this interpretation is subject to the assumption that the strength
of transmission in each centre is proportional to the number of active cases in that location.
This assumption is consistent with the observation that the majority of individuals start and
end their journeys in the same locations, but there is not sufficient data to unequivocally
determine the relationship between transmission risk within an area and active case numbers
in the resident population of that area. Therefore, it is appropriate to think of our method
as a heuristic approach to estimating transmission risk based only on qualitative information
about epidemiological factors and informed by near-real-time estimates of mobility patterns.
These are derived from a biased sample of the population (a subset of Facebook users),
and aggregated to represent movement between regions containing on the order of 103 to
105 individuals.
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A. Context-specific Factors
Outbreaks occur in different contexts, some of which may suggest use of external data sources
to infer at-risk sub-populations. Such inference can be used to refine spatial risk prediction.
For example, the workplace outbreak we investigated occurred in a meat processing facility,
where the virus spread among workers at the plant and their contacts. To adapt the general
method to this context, we averaged OD matrices over the subset of our data capturing the
transition between nighttime and daytime locations, as an estimate of work-related travel. In
addition, we examined the effect of including industry of employment statistics as an additional
risk factor. In this case, we used data collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to
estimate the proportion of meat workers by residence in each LGA, and weighted the outgoing
traveller numbers by the proportion associated with the place of origin.
The resulting relative risk value Ri is a crude estimate of the probability that an individual:
• travelled from origin location i into the region containing the outbreak centre;
• travelled during the period when many cases were pre-symptomatic and no targeted inter-
vention measures had been applied;
• made their trip(s) during the time of day associated with travel to work and;
• were part of the specific subgroup associated with the outbreak centre (in this case, those
employed in meat-processing occupations).
The variation described above is specific for workplace outbreaks in which employees are
infected, but could be generally applied to any context where a defined subgroup of the population
is more likely to be associated (e.g., school children, aged-care workers, etc.), or in which habitual
travel patterns associated with particular times of day are applicable.
III. RESULTS
For each of the three outbreak scenarios, we present the mobility-based estimates of the
relative transmission risk distribution, and a time-varying correlation between our estimate and
the case numbers ascertained through contact tracing and testing programs. For details of these
correlation computations, see the Supplementary Information.
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A. Cedar Meats
1. Scenario
Cedar Meats is an abattoir (slaughterhouse and meat packing facility) in Brimbank, Victoria.
It is located in the western area of Melbourne. It was the locus of one of the first sizeable
outbreaks in Australia after the initial wave of infections had been suppressed through wide-
spread physical distancing interventions. Meat processing facilities are particularly high-risk work
environments for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, so it is perhaps unsurprising that the first large
outbreak occurred in this environment [21, 22]. It began at a time when community transmission
in the region was otherwise undetected. As the transmission cluster grew, it was thoroughly
traced and subsequently controlled. The contact-tracing effort included (but was not limited to)
intensive testing of staff, each of which required a negative test before returning to work, 14-day
isolation periods for all exposed individuals, and daily follow-up calls with every close contact.
The outbreak was officially recognised on April 29th, when four cases were confirmed in workers
at the site and, according to media reports, Victoria DHHS informed the meatworks of these
findings [23]. The outbreak was first mentioned in the daily COVID-19 updates from Victoria
DHHS on May 2nd, when the number of confirmed cases associated with the cluster had risen
to eight [24].
The Cedar Meats outbreak began when it was introduced into the workplace, where it sub-
sequently spread to a large number of staff, and members of their households. We therefore
selected for the distribution of travellers that may have been travelling to work in the area of
Cedar Meats during the period over which undetected transmission was likely. Specifically, we
generated mobility risk maps based on trips into the Brimbank region for the nighttime → day-
time OD matrix, averaged over the period between April 21st, and April 27th, 2020. We note
that while there were only two SARS-CoV-2 positive cases associated with the cluster during
this period (in two different areas), 43 cases were detected in the following week with infected
individuals residing in 14 different locations.
As our estimate of transmission risk between Brimbank and other LGAs, we compute the risk
value Ri as the proportion of individuals arriving in Brimbank from any other Victorian LGA i
during the nighttime → daytime OD matrix. These values were computed with Equation 3 and
are shown as a directed network in Figure 1a. Because the outbreak occurred in an abattoir,
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we also explored the effect of weighting mobility by a context-specific factor: the proportion of
employed persons with occupations in meat processing (Figure 1b).
2. Risk estimates and validation with case numbers
The geographic distribution of relative transmission risk due to mobility into Brimbank during
the nighttime → daytime transition is presented in Figure 2(a), while the distribution generated
by including both mobility and the proportion of meat workers in each LGA is shown in Figure
2(b).
To validate our estimate, we computed Spearman’s correlation between this risk estimate for
each region to the time-dependent case count for each region documented over the course of
the outbreak (supplied by the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services). We use
Spearman’s rather than Pearson’s correlation because while we expect monotonic dependence
between estimated relative risk and case counts, we have no reason to expect linear dependence
or normally-distributed errors. The outbreak case data was supplied as a time series of cumulative
detected cases in each LGA for each day of the outbreak. Therefore, we present our correlation as
a function of time from April 29th, when recorded case numbers began to increase dramatically
(before May 1st, the number of affected LGAs was too small compute a confidence interval
(n ≤ 3)). As case numbers increase, correlation between our risk estimates and case numbers
stabilises at approximately 0.75 using mobility only (Figure 3a), and at approx. 0.81 when
including both mobility and meatworker proportions in the risk computation (Figure 3b). Due
to privacy limitations on release of case data, we do not present case numbers by LGA for the
Cedar Meats outbreak.
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FIG. 1. Risk factors for spatial proliferation of SARS-CoV-2 from the Cedar Meats outbreak in
Brimbank, Victoria. (a) Network visualisation of commuters into Brimbank during the period
spanning April 21st to April 27th, 2020 (arrow width is proportional to commuter numbers, with
the self-loop omitted). (b) The proportion of employed persons in each location working in meat
processing occupations as of the 2016 Census.
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FIG. 2. Regional distribution of transmission risk from the Cedar Meats outbreak in Brimbank
based on (a) mobility into Brimbank for daytime activities, and (b) the proportion of employed
persons with occupations in meat processing multiplied by the proportion of travellers to Brimbank
shown in (a). The yellow stars show the approximate location of the outbreak centre.
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FIG. 3. Correlation between risk estimates and cumulative cases as a function of time. Spearman’s
correlation between cases by LGA and proportion of mobility into Brimbank is shown in (a),
while (b) demonstrates the effect of including employment-specific contextual factors. Black dots
correspond to Spearman’s correlation (left y-axis), and the shaded interval is the 95% CI. For
reference, open red circles show total cumulative cases over all regions recorded for each day (right
y-axis).
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B. The Crossroads Hotel
1. Scenario
The next scenario we examine began with a single spreading event that occurred during a
large gathering at a social venue in Western Sydney. While workplaces have frequently been
the locus of COVID-19 clusters, many outbreaks have also been sparked by social gatherings
[25, 26]. In urban environments, such outbreaks can prove more challenging to trace, as the
exposed individuals may be only transiently associated with the outbreak location.
The Crossroads Hotel was the site of the first COVID-19 outbreak to occur in New South
Wales after the initial wave of infections was suppressed. The cluster was identified on July 10th,
2020, during a period when new cases numbered fewer than 10 notifications per day. However,
the second wave of community transmission in Victoria produced sporadic introductions in NSW,
one of which led to a spreading event at the Crossroads Hotel [27]. Based on media reports,
state contact-tracing data indicated that the cluster began on the evening of July 3rd, during a
large gathering [28].
Unlike the Cedar Meats cluster, the Crossroads Hotel scenario was not a workplace outbreak
with transmission occurring in the same context for a sustained time period, but a single spreading
event in a large social centre. For this reason, to estimate relevant mobility patterns we averaged
trip numbers over all time-windows in our data (daytime → evening → nighttime → daytime)
for the period of June 27th - July 4th. It was also necessary to perform some pre-processing of
the mobility data provided by Facebook in order to correlate case data provided by New South
Wales Health to our mobility-based risk estimates due to substantial differences in the geographic
boundaries used in the respective data sets (see Supplemental Information and Technical Note).
Aside from these minor differences, the method applied in this scenario is essentially the same
as the one described above for the Cedar Meats outbreak. Risk of transmission in an area is
assessed as the proportion of travellers who entered the outbreak location from that area (see
Equation 3).
2. Results
Correlation of our risk estimate to the number of cases in each LGA as a function of time
is shown in Figure 4(a). Heat maps of estimated risk and case numbers are shown in Figures
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4(b) and 4(c), respectively. In this analysis, the available data did not explicitly identify the
outbreak to which each case was associated, however, it did distinguish between cases associated
with local transmission clusters and those associated with international importation. Because
the Crossroads Hotel cluster was the only documented outbreak during this time, we attribute
to it all cluster-associated cases during the period investigated. This assumption is anecdotally
consistent with media reports that specify more detailed information about the residential location
of individuals associated with the outbreaks. The COVID-19 case data for New South Wales is
publicly available [29].
C. Victoria: Community Transmission
1. Scenario
Both of the previous case studies considered scenarios in which a localised outbreak occurred
in the context of very low or undetected community transmission. For our third case study we
consider a scenario in which community transmission had been detected across multiple suburbs
in metropolitan Melbourne. This began in Victoria during June and July, after lifting of the
social distancing restrictions that suppressed the initial outbreak in March. When community
transmission was ascertained there were already active cases in many regions around metropolitan
Melbourne, and no specific transmission centre was clearly identifiable (although transmission is
thought to have originated in hotels used to quarantine arriving travellers).
On June 1st, 2020, Victoria DHHS reported 71 active COVID-19 cases throughout the state,
with four new cases. By June 21st, this number had increased to 121 active cases (19 new)
at which point the state government initiated increased testing for community transmission and
re-introduction of limits on large gatherings. Subsequently, the number of active cases increased
to 645 by July 6th, and localised lockdowns were implemented in a set of 12 postcodes where
people were asked to stay at home unless working or attending to essential activities. These
targeted lockdowns were introduced in an attempt to avoid general imposition of the measures,
but they were extended to the entirety of metropolitan Melbourne on July 9th, with continuing
community transmission. These events are documented in the online series of daily updates
provided by Victoria DHHS [30].
We examine whether the areas affected by community transmission in late June and July
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FIG. 4. Comparison between estimated relative risk distribution and cluster-related case numbers
in New South Wales from July 12th to 28th. Spearman’s rank correlation as a function of time
is shown in (a). The spatial distribution of estimated relative risk on July 28th is shown in (b),
while the total number of cluster-associated cases in each LGA as of July 28th is shown in (c).
The yellow star in (b) and (c) indicates the location of the outbreak centre, the Crossroads Hotel
located in Liverpool, NSW.
could have been predicted based on case numbers and mobility data that were available in early
June. Our goal is to examine whether the effectiveness of mobility patterns in predicting relative
transmission risk from point outbreaks can extend to community transmission scenarios in which
outbreak sources are unknown.
In the community transmission scenario, as with the Crossroads Hotel outbreak, there were
no clear context-dependent factors that suggested the use of other population data. In contrast
to the first two scenarios, community transmission was occurring in multiple locations at the
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beginning of our investigation period. For each day, the unscaled risk estimate ri is the product
of the OD matrix (averaged over the preceding week) and the vector of active case numbers
in each location (see Equation 1). Therefore, in this case the relative risk value Ri represents
the proportion of travellers into all areas containing active cases, with the contribution of each
infected region weighted by the number of active cases (see Equation 2).
For this scenario, we investigate the correlation between relative risk estimates at time t, and
incident case numbers (notifications) at time t′, for all dates between June 1st and July 21st. We
performed this more extensive analysis because it was not clear at what point in the outbreak, if
any, conditions at time t would provide insight at a future time t′. In particular, we investigate
if and when the incorporation of mobility data gives insight not provided by active case numbers
alone.
2. Results
The results of our correlation analysis for the Victoria community transmission scenario are
shown in Figure 5. The correlations of incident cases at time t′ with active case numbers only and
active cases combined with mobility at time t are shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), respectively.
The added contribution of the mobility data as a function of t and t′ is shown in Figure 5(c), which
shows the difference between the mobility-based correlation value and the correlation based on
active case numbers alone. To demonstrate the geographic distribution of cases and the diffusion
of risk based on mobility, Figure 5(d) shows the active case counts documented for June 5th,
Figure 5(e) shows the corresponding distribution of transmission risk based on mobility patterns
from the preceding week, and Figure 5(f) shows the distribution of incident cases on July 15th.
For reference, the maps in Figures 5(d), 5(e), and 5(f) correspond to the point indicated by the
intersection of dashed lines in Figure 5(a).
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FIG. 5. The contribution of mobility information to relative risk estimates in a community trans-
mission scenario. The correlation between active cases at time t and incident cases at time t′ is
shown in (a) while the correlation of the mobility-based relative risk estimation at time t with
incident cases at time t′ is shown in (b). The benefit of including mobility information is indicated
in (c), which shows the values plotted in (b) minus those plotted in (a). The maps in (d), (e), and
(f) correspond to the (t, t′) point indicated in (a), and show the number of active cases on June 6th
(d), the distribution of mobility-related relative risk on that day (e), and the number of incident
cases on July 15th (f).
IV. DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to develop and critically analyse a simple procedure for translating
aggregate mobility data into estimates of the spatial distribution of relative transmission risk from
COVID-19 outbreaks. Our results indicate that aggregate mobility data can be a useful tool in
estimation of COVID-19 transmission risk diffusion from locations where active cases have been
identified. The utility of mobility data depends on the context of the outbreak and appears to
be more helpful in scenarios involving environments where context indicates specific risk factors.
The procedure we presented may also be useful during the early stages of community transmission
and could help determine the extent of selective intervention measures.
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In community transmission scenarios, mobility will already have played a role in determining
the distribution of case counts when community transmission is detected. Our results indicate
that the insight added by the incorporation of mobility data diminishes as case counts grow.
However, we also observed low correlations due to stochastic effects in the Crossroads Hotel
scenario. Taken together, these results indicate that there is an optimal usage window that opens
when case counts are high enough for aggregate mobility patterns to shed light on transmission
patterns, and closes when these transmission patterns begin to determine the distribution of
active cases which then predict their own future distribution with only limited information added
by considering mobility.
Our examination of the second wave of community transmission in Victoria showed that
several weeks before it was recognised, the spatial distribution of a small number of active cases
was indicative of the outbreak distribution more than 30 days later when interventions were
introduced. This indication improved slightly by including the diffusion of risk computed from
available mobility data. Qualitatively, this observation indicates that even when case numbers
were small, low-level community transmission may have already been taking place throughout
the region of metropolitan Melbourne. This suggests that earlier selective lockdown measures,
extending beyond the borders of regions in which cases had been identified, may have been more
effective at containing transmission.
This type of relative risk estimation procedure is relevant to public health decisions relating to
selective lockdown measures or the imposition of mandated infection control policies upon either
the initial introduction of an infectious disease into a susceptible population or the resurgence of
a previously suppressed epidemic. Australia is currently (as of August, 2020) in the early phases
of the latter scenario and there is a need for policy decision frameworks aimed at preventing
resurgence of the epidemic while minimising economic consequences of further intervention.
A. Limitations
1. Privacy, anonymity, and aggregation
It is essential that the use of mobility data for disease surveillance comply with privacy and
ethical considerations [11]. Due to this requirement, there will always be trade-offs between
the spatiotemporal resolution of aggregated mobility data and the completeness of the data set
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after curation, which typically involves the addition of noise and the removal of small numbers
based on a specified threshold. To help ensure users cannot be identified, Facebook removes
OD pairs with fewer than 10 unique users over the 8-hr aggregation period. The combination
of this aggregation period with the 10-user threshold affects regional representation in the data
set, particularly in more sparsely populated areas. The final product resulting from these choices
contains frequently-updated and temporally-specific mobility patterns for densely populated urban
areas, at the cost of incomplete data in sparsely populated regions. In general, increased temporal
or spatial resolution will reduce trip numbers in any given set of raw data, which can have a
dramatic impact on the amount of information missing from the curated numbers [31].
2. Stochastic effects
The comparison of our results from the Cedar Meats outbreak and those from the Crossroads
Hotel cluster demonstrate that the utility of aggregated mobility patterns in estimation of the
spatial distribution of relative risk depends on the context of the outbreak, with more value in
situations involving habitual mobility such as commuting to and from work. Detailed examination
of the inconsistencies between risk estimates and case data from the Crossroads Hotel outbreak
indicate that small numbers of people travelling longer distances were responsible for the relative
lack of correspondence in that scenario. In particular, news reports discussed instances of single
individuals who had travelled from the rural suburbs to visit the Crossroads Hotel for the July
3rd gathering who then infected their family members. These scenarios were not consistent with
the risk predictions produced by the mobility patterns into and out of the region and exemplify
the limitations of risk assessment based on aggregate behavioural data.
3. Sample bias
The mobility data provided by the Facebook Data For Good program represents a non-uniform
and essentially uncharacterised sample of the population. While it is a large sample, with aggre-
gate counts on the order of 10% of ABS population figures, the spatial bias introduced by the
condition of mobile app usage cannot be determined due to data aggregation and anonymisation.
While it is possible to count the number of Facebook users present in any location during the
specified time-intervals, it is not possible to distinguish which of those are located in their places
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of residence. In order to account for the (possibly many) biases affecting the sample, a detailed
demographic study would be necessary that is beyond the scope of the present work. A heat map
(Supplemental Figure S1) of the average number of Facebook users present during the nighttime
period (2am to 10am) as a proportion of the estimated resident population reported by the ABS
(2018 [32]) shows qualitative similarity to the spatial distributions of active cases and relative
risk shown in Figure 5(d) and (e). This dual-correspondence suggests the presence of common
factors affecting both representation in the Facebook dataset and the risk of transmission. To
investigate the potential influence of spatial sampling bias on our correlations, we performed
a simple bias correction the results of which are shown in Supplemental Figure S2. We did
not include this bias correction as a component of our general analysis because it is unclear to
what degree the correction is accurate, given a lack of detailed information on the individuals
represented in Facebook user population data. That is, the bias correction we tested may have
introduced different, uncharacterised biases.
B. Future Work
On a fundamental level, mobility patterns are responsible for observed departures from contin-
uum mechanics observed in real epidemics [33]. Over the past two decades, due to public health
concern over the pandemic potential of SARS, MERS, and novel influenza, spatially explicit
models of disease transmission have become commonplace in simulations of realistic pandemic
intervention policies [34, 35]. Such models rely on descriptions of mobility patterns which are
usually derived from static snapshots of mobility obtained from census data [31, 36, 37]. While
this approach is justifiable given the known importance of mobility in disease transmission, it
is also clear that the shocks to normal mobility behaviour induced by the intervention policies
of the COVID-19 pandemic will not be captured by static treatments of mobility patterns. To
account for the dynamic effects of intervention, several models have been developed to simulate
the imposition of social distancing measures through adjustments to the strength of context-
specific transmission factors [38, 39]. This type of treatment implicitly affects the degree of
mixing between regions without explicitly altering the topology of the mobility network on which
the model is based and it is unclear whether such a treatment is adequate to capture the complex
response of human population behaviour. Given the results of our analysis, the incorporation of
real-time changes in mobility patterns could add policy-relevant layers of realism to such models
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that currently rely on static, sometimes dated, depictions of human movement.
V. CODE AND DATA AVAILABILITY
Example scripts and data used for computing risk estimates and correlations can be found in
the associated GitHub repository:
https://github.com/cjzachreson/COVID-19-Mobility-Risk-Mapping
However, due to release restrictions on the mobility data provided by Facebook, the OD
matrices are not included as these were derived from the data provided by the Facebook Data
For Good program (random matrices are included as placeholders). The processed mobility data
used in this work may be made available upon request to the authors, subject to conditions of
release consistent with the Facebook Data For Good Program access agreement.
A generic implementation of the code used to re-partition OD matrices between different
geospatial boundary definitions is enclosed in the supplementary Technical Note.
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S1. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A. Description of Mobility Data
The data used in our study was provided by the Facebook Data for Good program. The data
set (in the Disease Prevention Maps subset) is aggregated from individual-level GPS coordinates
collected from the use of Facebook’s mobile app. Therefore, the raw data is biased to over-
represent the movements of any subpopulations more likely to utilise social media applications
on mobile devices. After collection, the data is spatially and temporally aggregated as a list
of trip numbers between Bing Tiles [40] within a rectangular raster pattern (i.e., centered on a
country, state, or city). The sizes and boundaries of these discrete locations are determined by an
optimisation procedure that produces the smallest subregion size possible (down to a minimum
size of 600m × 600m), given the extent of the region of interest and the requirement for near-
real time release of new data. A trip between locations is defined based on the most frequently
visited tile in the first 8-hour period and the most frequently-visited tile in the subsequent 8-hour
period. Finally, before the data is released, any entries showing fewer than 10 trips between a
pair of locations are removed to protect the privacy of individual users. For Australia, the state-
level data consists of trip numbers between 2km × 2km tiles. By comparing this scale to larger
(national-scale) and smaller (city-scale) regions of interest, we determined that the state-level
data provided the best balance, with trip numbers large enough to produce a sufficiently dense
network of connections while still providing a subregion size that is usually smaller than the Local
Government Areas for which case data is reported.
1. Generating correspondences
Because the raw mobility data is provided as movements between tiles, while case data is
provided based on the boundaries of Local Government Areas. We note that while Facebook
releases data aggregated to administrative regions, these regions were not geographically consis-
tent with the current LGA boundaries for Australia. In order to ensure consistency of our method
across datasets and jurisdictions, we produced our own correspondence system. We did this by
performing two spatial join operations. These associate either tiles or LGAs with Meshblocks (the
smallest geographic partition on which the Australian Bureau of Statistics releases population
data). Meshblocks were associated based on their centroid locations. Each meshblock centroid
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was associated to the tile with the nearest centroid and to the LGA containing it. We did not
split meshblocks whose boundaries lay on either side of an LGA or tile boundary, as their sizes
are sufficiently small that edge effects are negligible (in addition, the set of LGAs forms a com-
plete partition of meshblocks, so edge effects were only observed for tile associations). We then
associated tiles to LGAs proportionately based on the fraction of the total meshblock population
within that tile that was associated with each overlapping LGA.
2. Re-partitioning mobility data
Once a correspondence is established between the tile partitions on which mobility data is
released and the LGA partitions on which case data is released, the matrix of connections between
tiles must be converted into a matrix of connections between LGAs. The Supplementary Technical
Note explains how we performed this step, and gives a general method for converting matrices
between partition schemes. Briefly, the number of trips between two locations in the initial
data is split between the overlapping set of partitions in the new set of boundaries (in this case,
local government areas), based on the correspondence between partition schemes determined as
explained in the previous subsection.
3. Spatial biases in Facebook mobility data
To investigate the spatial sample biases present in the mobility data provided by Facebook,
we examined the ratio of Facebook users to ABS 2018 population for each suburb in Victoria.
While the true number varies from day to day, an example of this distribution is shown as a heat
map in Supplemental Figure S1, which displays the average number of Facebook mobile app
users indexed to each LGA between the hours of 2am and 10am from May 15th to June 25th,
divided by the estimated resident population reported by the ABS in 2018. The distribution is
narrow, with most urban areas falling in the range of 5 % to 10 % Facebook users. However,
this is not an exact representation of residential population proportions, as many mobile users
work during the nighttime and will not be located at their residence during the selected period.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to precisely quantify the bias introduced by Facebook’s sampling
scheme.
Despite these limitations, it may still be informative to examine whether accounting for the bias
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FIG. S1. Heat map of the proportion of Facebook users estimated for each LGA. The values are
computed as the number of Facebook users who were found in each location during the hours
of 2am until 10am averaged from May 15th to June 25th, divided by the residential population
recorded by the ABS in 2018.
pictured in Figure S1 affects our validation. To determine this, we re-computed the correlations
pictured in Figures 3(a) and 5(b) (corresponding to the Cedar Meats and Victoria community
transmission scenarios). To do so, we multiplied all mobility flows out of each region by the
inverse proportion of Facebook users to the total number of residents in the origin location. For
the reasons discussed above, this is not an exact accounting for sample bias, but may partially
correct for heterogeneity in the proportion of travellers counted in mobility data released by
Facebook.
For the Cedar Meats outbreak scenario, accounting for the Facebook sample bias in this way
improves the correlation between our mobility-based relative risk estimate and the recorded case
counts (Figure S2a). For the community transmission scenario, performing this extra step does
not appear to substantially change the result shown in Figure 5 (compare Figure S2b and Figure
5c).
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FIG. S2. Correlations between partially bias-corrected risk estimates and documented case num-
bers. Spearman’s rank correlation between cumulative case numbers by LGA and the modified
relative risk estimate for the Cedar Meats outbreak is shown in (a). Subfigure (b) shows the par-
tially bias-corrected version of Figure 5(c), demonstrating the effect of including bias-corrected
mobility with active case numbers at time t in estimation of relative incident case risk at time t′.
B. Correlating Risk Estimates to Case Data
We used Spearman’s rank correlation to investigate the correspondence between our relative
risk estimates and documented case data. This measure of correlation is typically used when
comparing ordinal data, or, more generally, when monotonic relationships are expected, but
errors are not normally-distributed. In order to investigate the monotonicity between relative risk
estimates and reported case numbers, we aligned the documented case data for all regions in
which infections had been tabulated against the corresponding relative risk estimates for those
regions. Note that our correlations did not include regions for which no case data was available.
Therefore, our correlation results illustrate the degree to which risk estimates are monotonic with
case numbers, but do not account for any risk estimates made in areas with no cases to compare
to. This results in a high degree of uncertainty when the number of affected areas is small,
reflected by the wide confidence intervals observed in the early stages of the Cedar Meats and
Crossroads Hotel outbreaks (Figures 3, and 4a, respectively).
The 95% confidence intervals were computed using Fisher’s Z transformation with quantile
parameter α = 1.96.
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C. ABS Data Sources
Two data sets from the Australian Bureau of Statistics were used in this study: 1) number of
residents by industry of occupation (2016), and 2) resident population (2018).
1. Population by LGA
The distributions shown in Figure S1 were computed by dividing the number of Facebook users
indexed to each LGA during the nighttime period by the resident population in each LGA. We
obtained the population data from the ABS 2018 population dataset which is publicly available
[32]. The Facebook user populations are provided by the Data For Good program in addition to
the mobility data discussed above.
2. Employed persons by industry of occupation
As a context-specific risk factor for the Cedar Meats outbreak we obtained the number of
individuals by place of usual residence and industry of occupation. Specifically, we obtained the
number of residents in each Local Government Area (2016 boundaries), employed in the occu-
pation categories “Meat Boners and Slicers and Slaughterers” and “Meat Poultry and Seafood
Process Workers”. This data from the 2016 Australian Census of Population and Housing is
available from the ABS TableBuilder web application [41]. We used a population-weighted corre-
spondence list to convert the data provided on geospatial boundaries of 2016 Local Government
Areas into 2018 Local Government Area boundaries. For the Melbourne region in which this
data was applied, these boundaries have not changed substantially between 2016 and 2018.
To compute the factors used to weight the mobility-based relative risk predictions, we divided
the total number of workers in both of the above categories by the number of employed persons
(those employed full time or part-time) in each LGA, which we also drew from the 2016 Australian
Census via Census TableBuilder.
D. Case Data
COVID-19 case data by local government area is available from Australian jurisdictional health
authorities. For this work, we used data provided by NSW Health [29] (all data is publicly
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available) and from Victoria DHHS. The data used for the Cedar Meats outbreak scenario was
obtained from DHHS through a formal request to the Victorian Agency for Health Information
(VAHI) and cannot be made public in this work. The case data by LGA used to evaluate the
Victoria community transmission scenario was taken directly from the COVID-19 daily update
archives available on the DHHS public website [30].
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